

The Recruitment of Colonial Troops in Africa and Asia and their Deployment in Europe during the First World War

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The impact of the First World War on the colonies was profound and many-sided.¹ A conflict that began in the Balkans turned into a general European war in July and August 1914, and then took on extra-European dimensions, particularly as some of the belligerent states ranked as the most important colonial powers globally.

After the outbreak of the war, there was immediate fighting in several parts of the world as Great Britain, France, Belgium and Japan as well as the British dominions Australia, New Zealand and South Africa attacked the German colonies in Africa, Asia and the Pacific. Most of these territories were conquered by the Entente powers within a short time. Already in October and November 1914, Japanese troops occupied the German islands in Micronesia and captured the city of Tsingtau, where about 5000 Germans were made prisoners of war. Between August and November 1914 troops from Australia and New Zealand conquered Samoa, New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago, all of them German possessions.²

The German colonies in Africa were defended by so-called ‘Schutztruppen’, made up of German officers and African soldiers. While British and French troops overwhelmed Togo in August 1914, the fighting in Cameroon lasted until January 1916.³ German South West Africa was attacked by South Africa on behalf of the Entente powers. This caused problems in South Africa itself, however, for about 11,500 Anglophobe Boer soldiers rebelled, some of them openly joining the German side. The South African war between the British empire and the Boers had only ended 12 years before, and many Boers had preserved their anti-British

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feelings. Once this rebellion was crushed, the Germans were left defenceless, for 50,000 South African soldiers faced only 5,000 men in the German colonial forces. When South African troops entered the capital city Windhuk in May 1915, they did not meet any resistance.⁴

The most important colonial theatre was German East Africa, where fighting lasted until the end of the war. German forces here were under the command of Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and consisted of only about 7,500 men, most of them Africans. British troops, on the other hand, comprised about 160,000 soldiers and one million carriers. All the same, they were not able to defeat the Germans for more than four years, for Lettow-Vorbeck soon turned to a guerrilla strategy and escaped again and again. Furthermore, he also attacked Belgian and Portuguese colonial troops. Only in November 1918, after about 10,000 British soldiers and 100,000 carriers had died, did Lettow-Vorbeck surrender. The fighting in East Africa had a catastrophic economic as well as ecological impact. The economies of German East Africa and of bordering British colonies were deeply damaged by both sides' ongoing use of forced recruitment. Famines and epidemics spread and lasted beyond the war's end. Furthermore, migrations caused by the war led to a spread of the tsetse fly, which in turn explains the prevalence of sleeping sickness in East Africa in the following decades.⁵

However, the colonies (or some of them) were not only theatres of war, but they were also integrated into the European powers' domestic war economies. They supplied goods and some of them also made financial contributions. India, for instance, contributed £146 million to the British war costs between 1914 and 1920 and supplied products such as cotton, jute, paper and wool. In the French possessions in North Africa, the process of integration into France's war economy led to far-ranging administrative and economic reforms. Increasing demand for foodstuff at first improved the economic situation of North Africa's agriculture. In the years 1917 and 1918, however, harvests in Algeria and Tunisia were very bad, which caused famines. Furthermore, hitherto imported industrial goods were replaced by home-made ones, which promoted the development of a North African industry. However, no sustainable industrialisation process took place. After the end of the war, imports from France would destroy these nascent industries in North Africa.⁶ French West Africa mainly provided palm oil, palm kernel and peanuts. However, its integration into the French war economy was chaotic rather than planned. The French colonial and military administration could not decide whether this area should be used primarily as a base for economic exploitation or whether the focus should be laid on the recruitment of soldiers.⁷

In addition to the fighting in the colonies and the increased economic exploitation of native peoples for the war effort in Europe, the First World War also witnessed migration from the colonial world to Europe on an unprecedented scale. Among the temporary migrants from the colonies and semi-colonial regions to Europe were both war workers and soldiers.

About 215,000 civilian war workers from South Africa (31,200), the West Indies (8,000), Mauritius (1,000) and the Fiji Islands (100) as well as from China (92,000) and Egypt (82,000) came to work behind the British front,⁸ whilst France recruited about 220,000 workers from outside Europe, coming from Algeria (75,900), Indochina (49,000), Morocco (35,000), Tunisia (18,500) and Madagascar (5,500) as well as from China (36,700).⁹ The massive presence of extra-European male war workers led to problems in France. French workers often saw these colonial migrants as rivals for jobs as well as for women, and there were numerous attacks on them, especially towards the end of the war. French trade unions were on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, they stressed internationalism and rejected all forms of racism. On the other hand, they were aware that the colonial workers were often misused as strike breakers. The French government, for its part, pursued a policy of strict segregation between colonial workers and French civilians and would send the former home as soon as possible after the end of the war.¹⁰

Even more significant in terms of both numbers and public attention was the temporary migration of colonial soldiers to Europe. The Entente powers deployed about 650,000 colonial soldiers on European battlefields. White European settlers from the colonies and dominions, who provided large contingents as well, are not included in this figure. The Central Powers, on the other hand, were not able to deploy any colonial troops in Europe.

Britain, altogether, mobilised about 1.5 million Indian soldiers during the war, of which about 90,000 were killed. Some 150,000 Indian soldiers were deployed in Europe from September 1914 on. The overwhelming majority of Indian troops, however, fought in Mesopotamia against the Ottoman empire.¹¹

On the other hand, Britain did not deploy any African troops on European battlefields, although there was a group of officers and politicians with a colonial background lobbying to do so.¹² Winston Churchill, for instance, claimed in a House of Commons speech in May 1916 that not only 10–12 Indian divisions but also African units should be trained for deployment in Europe:

Let us . . . think what historians of the future would write if they were writing a history of the present time and had to record that Great Britain

was forced to make an inconclusive peace because she forgot Africa; that at a time when every man counted . . . the Government of Great Britain was unable to make any use of a mighty continent . . . It would be incredible; but it is taking place . . . What is going on while we sit here, while we go away to dinner, or home to bed? Nearly 1,000 men – Englishmen, Britishers, men of our own race – are knocked into bundles of bloody rags every twenty-four hours . . . Every measure must be considered, and none put aside while there is hope of obtaining something from it.¹³

Plenty of British African troops, however, fought in the Middle East and in Africa itself. Some battalions of the black ‘British West Indies Regiment’ were deployed in France, but only in ancillary functions, not as combatants.¹⁴ Officially, this policy was justified with reference to logistical problems, but racism probably played a role as well, for after the United States had joined the war, the British army also rejected the training of African-American soldiers, who were eventually incorporated into the French army.¹⁵

Unlike Britain, the French deployed large numbers of African troops in Europe, including 172,800 soldiers from Algeria, 134,300 from West Africa, 60,000 from Tunisia, 37,300 from Morocco, 34,400 from Madagascar and 2100 from the Somali Coast. Another colonial contingent of about 44,000 men came from Indochina.¹⁶ Italy, who joined the Entente side in spring 1915, tried to deploy African colonial troops in Europe as well. In August 1915, some 2,700 soldiers from Libya were shipped to Sicily. However, they did not enter the front line, because many soldiers died from pneumonia immediately after their arrival, and so, the Libyans, who were designated for Alpine warfare, were shipped home again after a short time. In the African theatres of war, however, Italy deployed plenty of Eritrean, Libyan and Somali soldiers.¹⁷

My contribution shall focus on three aspects of this transcontinental military migration between 1914 and 1918. In the first instance, I will analyse colonial recruitment policies and the responses they met by the colonised. Secondly, I shall consider the colonial troops’ deployment on European battlefields, including two issues often discussed by contemporaries: whether colonial troops were misused as cannon fodder and whether they fought particularly cruelly. And finally, the cultural impact of military migration, especially mutual perception of Europeans and colonial soldiers, will be analysed.

Recruitment

Recruitment of colonial troops in India followed the traditional pattern of the theory of ‘martial races’. The British army only recruited from the small

number of castes it considered 'martial', which effectively eliminated most of the Indian population from the manpower pool. Furthermore, Indian troops were segregated by caste into companies and battalions. As such, replacements could not be assigned where needed but had to go to units restricted to their caste.¹⁸

Whereas the British colonial troops consisted exclusively of volunteers, the French recruitment policy in North and West Africa was a mixed one, including the enlistment of volunteers as well as conscription. In 1912, the French parliament had passed several acts enabling conscription in West Africa, Algeria and Tunisia (but not in Morocco), if the numbers of volunteers were considered to be too low. Conscription became more and more important the longer the war lasted.¹⁹ Whilst in 1915 only 2,500 out of a total of 14,500 new recruits in Algeria were conscripts, this ratio changed dramatically in the second half of the war. In 1917, the army enlisted 6,261 volunteers and 25,925 conscripts, in the following year there were 13,942 volunteers and 34,173 conscripts.²⁰ During the 1915/16 recruiting campaign in West Africa, only 7,000 out of 53,000 recruits were volunteers.²¹ The customary procedure was to ask local chiefs to provide potential recruits. Most often, young men from lower social strata, especially from the group of domestic slaves, were presented to French recruitment officers.

French recruitment in West Africa met all sorts of resistance, ranging from malingering and self-mutilation to flight into the bush or to Liberia, Gambia, Portuguese Guinea and the Gold Coast. In Senegal alone, some 15,000 men avoided conscription by hiding in the bush or flight. In some cases, as in Bélé Dougou in 1915, there was even armed resistance against French colonial administration and recruitment officers. Other rebellions such as the big uprising in Western Volta in 1915/16 and several revolts in the north of Dahomey in 1916 and 1917 were at least partially caused by French recruitment policies.²²

In North Africa, there was resistance against forced recruitment as well. As early as the autumn of 1914, young Arabs threatened by conscription and their relatives protested against French recruitment practices in several parts of Algeria. In the winter of 1916/17, Algerian resistance against conscription climaxed in a big uprising in the southern parts of Constantinois.²³ In Tunisia, too, there were several smaller rebellions in the years 1915 and 1916.²⁴ Only Morocco, where there was no conscription, remained quiet.

In spite of these acts of resistance, certain military and colonial circles in metropolitan France were in favour of an expansion of colonial recruitment. In 1915, General Charles Mangin launched a propaganda

campaign for the recruitment of half a million soldiers in the French colonies. Mangin was already well known as a former participant in the 1898/99 Fashoda expedition and as the most important advocate of the *force noire*, a strong African army for deployment in Europe, from 1909 on. Whilst most metropolitan newspapers supported his suggestions enthusiastically, colonial experts remained rather sceptical. So did the French government, which decided on a modest expansion of recruitment in Africa only.²⁵ In March 1916, ministerial attaché Paulin wrote to the colonial administration in Dakar that the colonial minister had agreed to a further enlistment campaign 'only because he was forced into it by public and parliamentary opinion, although he was never really convinced by it'.²⁶

French colonial officials had first been in favour of recruitment, but, in view of African resistance, they soon changed their minds. In August 1914, William Ponty, Governor-General of French West Africa, had written to Paris that 'there would be extreme enthusiasm if people were informed that the natives were to be given the honour to fight in France'.²⁷ His successor Clozel, however, stated only a year later:

The brutal and badly prepared effort demanded by Ponty, aggravated by the officers' incompetence, has completely disgusted everyone. We are exhausted. No more cadres, no more physicians to examine recruits seriously . . . I shall launch another modest recruitment drive, so that, if the war continues, we can send six or seven thousand men in order to fill the holes, but this will be a terrible effort.²⁸

In September 1917, Governor-General Joost van Vollenhoven obtained a temporary cessation of recruitment in French West Africa. Vollenhoven stressed that France should rather prioritise the economic exploitation of West Africa:

This African empire is poor in men but rich in products, so let us use its miserable population for food supply during the war and for post-war times! This country has been ruined just to recruit another few thousands of men!²⁹

Furthermore, Vollenhoven pointed at African resistance against recruitment:

Recruiting the Black army out of volunteers is a utopia; its creator has been mistaken, facts have proved this so dramatically that this issue can no longer be discussed . . . Since the beginning of the war, recruitment has become a hunt for men . . . Out of recruitment has resulted an unpopularity that has become universal from the very day when recruits were asked to serve in Europe and grim, determined, terrible revolts started against the white man, who had hitherto been tolerated, sometimes even loved, but who, transformed into a recruiting agent,

had become a detested enemy, the image of the slave hunters he had defeated and replaced himself.³⁰

When the government in Paris in winter 1917/18 decided to resume recruitment in West Africa, Vollenhoven desperately wrote:

The natives don't want to supply any more men and we won't get more by convincing them. If we really need new *tirailleurs*, we will have to recruit them forcibly, running the risk of a general revolt.³¹

Embittered, he resigned and volunteered for the front, where he fell in July 1918.³²

In order to organise the new recruitment campaign, the French government appointed Blaise Diagne *Commissaire de la République dans l'Ouest Africain* with the powers of a Governor-General. Diagne had been the first Black African to be elected as a deputy in the French parliament in 1914. Like some African-American leaders, he considered and propagated war service as a means to obtain rights. By September 1918, he had recruited 77,000 soldiers, many more than he had been expected to do. However, most of them were not deployed before the end of the war.³³

French officials in North Africa were less hostile towards conscription than their colleagues in West Africa. Charles Lutaud, Governor-General of Algeria, even explicitly announced an expansion of conscription of Arabs in 1916.³⁴ In the following year, however, he opposed governmental plans for a premature enlistment of the 1918 age group, arguing that 'even though we managed to suppress last November's uprising, the tribes' submission is far from absolute.'³⁵ Thereupon, the government renounced these plans and even reintroduced the system of replacements and dispensations they had, against Lutaud's will, abolished the year before. However, the government's ambition to recruit another 50,000 Algerian Arabs in 1918 by abolishing the system of dispensations again and expanding conscription to the south of Algeria, where no working colonial administration was yet in existence, was criticised by colonial officials as unrealistic. When Paris persisted, colonial administrations put the new policy into practice. However they managed to recruit far fewer soldiers than Paris had hoped for.³⁶

In the second half of the war, those in favour of a strong *armée jaune* also became more and more influential and recruitment in Indochina was intensified.³⁷ However, Indochinese soldiers were mainly deployed in ancillary functions, for there were reservations concerning their fighting abilities. In addition to conscription in its own colonies, several proposals were made to recruit paid fighters in Ethiopia, Somalia and Yemen. The French government, however, never seriously considered these plans, which would have boosted German propaganda's allegations that the

Entente powers were cowards who preferred to rely on mercenaries to do their fighting.³⁸

Deployment

Colonial troops had already entered the front line in Europe in the first months of the war. At the end of September 1914, two Indian divisions (the 3rd Lahore and the 7th Meerut division) as well as a cavalry brigade arrived in Marseilles and in October, the first Indian soldiers were deployed at Ypres. In the following months, Indian troops fought in many important battles on the western front, for instance at Festubert in December 1914 and in September 1915; in the second battle of Ypres in March 1915, where they for the first time were confronted with gas attacks; and at Loos in September 1915.

It soon became clear, however, that Indian troops were poorly prepared for modern industrialised warfare. As British policy since the 1857 mutiny had been to keep the Indian army always one generation behind in weaponry, they first had to be completely re-equipped at Marseilles where they received new rifles, ammunition, machine-guns, and both field and heavy batteries of artillery. Nevertheless, the losses of the first weeks were extremely high. Furthermore, evidence began to mount in November 1914 that men of many different battalions were shooting themselves in order to be taken out of the line. Thus, throughout the year 1915, British military leaders, who mainly attributed these failures to the climate, debated whether Indian troops would better be deployed elsewhere. The two infantry divisions were eventually withdrawn from the western front in December 1915 and shipped to extra-European theatres of war, mainly to Mesopotamia.

The Indian cavalry remained in Europe and would fight in several important battles on the western front, for instance at the Somme in July 1916. Furthermore, an Indian infantry brigade also participated in the Gallipoli operation from April 1915 to January 1916. The overwhelming majority of the Indian army, however, was deployed in the Middle East as well as in East Africa.³⁹

Autumn 1914 also witnessed the first actions of African troops on the western front. Although North African units had already fought in previous European wars – in the Crimean war from 1854 to 1856, in the Italian war in 1859 and in the Franco-Prussian war in 1870/71 –, this was the first time that troops from sub-Saharan Africa had entered the front line. In September 1914, West African units fought in Picardy. In October and November, *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* were deployed at Ypres, where they suffered heavy losses.

Afterwards, a new doctrine was applied: West African troops no longer fought as independent units, but they were 'amalgamated' with European troops. Every regiment of the *troupes coloniales*, which were composed of Europeans, got a West African battalion after the historical model of amalgamation of old troops and volunteer corps during the French Revolution.⁴⁰ The same doctrine was enacted for North African troops, who were often amalgamated into so-called *régiments mixtes* together with European settlers from North Africa. This doctrine was also aimed at preventing the desertion of Muslim soldiers to the Germans, who were using their alliance with the Ottoman empire to pose as friends of Islam and even to recruit Muslim POWs to the Central Powers' cause.⁴¹

In the following years, African troops participated in most of the principal battles on the western front, for instance at the Marne, at the Yser, at the Somme and at Verdun.⁴² Furthermore, West African troops also participated in the Gallipoli operation and fought in the Balkans from 1916 onwards. Their number grew as the war continued. Thus while 17 West African battalions fought on the western front in 1916, there were already 41 in 1917 and even 92 in the war's final year. The number of North African soldiers fighting in Europe increased considerably as well.

Two questions concerning the colonial troops' deployment in Europe were already contentious during the war itself, namely whether colonial troops were misused as cannon fodder and whether they fought especially cruelly. The cannon fodder theory also entered scholarly discussions after the war.⁴³

Charles Mangin, the most important promoter of the *force noire*, had already propagated the deployment of African units as shock troops in pre-war times. Mangin had argued that because of its demographic development, France would have to rely on colonial forces to a much higher degree in the future. For historical as well as racial reasons, West African warriors would be especially well-suited to fill the gap. They had already been held in high esteem by Arab and Ottoman rulers as very martial people. In addition, Mangin argued, they were especially suitable for modern warfare because of their underdeveloped nervous system and their hereditary fatalism that would allow them to sleep in the trenches in the midst of a battle, if they were ordered to do so.⁴⁴

On the western front, African troops were indeed often deployed as shock troops. Thus, French soldiers used to interpret the emergence of African troops as an unmistakable sign that an attack was imminent. Henri Barbusse, for instance, in his literary war diary *Le Feu*, described Moroccan soldiers as follows:

One looks at them and is silent. One would not speak to them. They are imposing and even frighten a bit. . . . Of course they are heading for the front line. This is their place, and their arrival means we are about to attack. They are made for attacking.⁴⁵

French propaganda also developed similar themes:

From the very first hour on, African regiments had the privilege to occupy the most dangerous posts, which permitted them to enrich their book of traditions and past glory.⁴⁶

Colonel Petitdemange, responsible for West Africans' training in the camp of Fréjus in southern France, wrote in a letter in January 1918 to a colleague that African soldiers were 'cannon fodder, who should, in order to save whites' lives, be made use of much more intensively'.⁴⁷ And even Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, in a speech delivered to the French Senate on 20 February 1918, stated:

We are going to offer civilisation to the Blacks. They will have to pay for that. . . . I would prefer that ten Blacks are killed rather than one Frenchman – although I immensely respect those brave Blacks –, for I think that enough Frenchmen are killed anyway and that we should sacrifice as few as possible!⁴⁸

Thus it is clear that there was at least the intention to assign colonial troops to especially dangerous tasks. The question remains, however, whether this doctrine caused significantly higher casualty rates than with European troops. After the war, Mangin published the following casualty rates for the French army:

Colonial soldiers: 20.0%
European soldiers: 15.8%
European officers: 22.0%.⁴⁹

These figures have repeatedly been interpreted in scholarly debates on the cannon fodder thesis.⁵⁰ However, any attempt to verify or challenge this thesis by interpreting casualty rates is problematic for several reasons. Firstly, there is an issue with the statistics themselves. For the whole period, French casualties were registered for the different ranks, but not for the soldiers' origin. The figures most commonly quoted come from a report by Baron Lyons de Feuchin, published in 1924 on behalf of the army committee of the French parliament. According to this report, 22% of deployed West African soldiers fell in the war, 13% of North Africans and 7% of other French colonial troops. In total, the casualty rate of French colonial troops was 14%, while that for European combatants in the French army reached 18%.⁵¹

Yet there is much confusion over the casualty rates of African troops. In the official *Histoire militaire de l' A. O. F.*, published in 1931, as well as in a 1936 publication by the *Ministère des Pensions*, West Africans' casualty rate was slightly lower than in Feuchin's report. According to a 1919 study by the *Direction des Troupes Coloniales*, it was even considerably lower, reaching only 19%.⁵² On the other hand, according to non-official figures, West Africans' real casualty rate was considerably higher. Colonial officer Edouard de Martonne published a figure of 65,000 West Africans killed in action, which would equal a casualty rate of 48%.⁵³ For the casualty rates of North African contingents there is confusion as well. The number of Moroccan soldiers killed in action ranges between 2500 and 9000 or between 7% and 24%.⁵⁴ The most frequently cited figure for fallen Algerians is 19,000 or 11%. Immediately after the war, however, reported Algerian dead reached up to 56,000 or 32.5%.⁵⁵ Some scholars even claim that 100,000 Algerians were killed.⁵⁶

Yet, even if the statistics were more reliable, it would be too simplistic to base any judgment of the cannon fodder thesis on global figures of killed and wounded alone, for this neglects the temporal dimension of deployment. The overwhelming majority of Indian troops, for instance, were only in Europe for 15 months and their time spent at the front was probably shorter than that of European soldiers. West African troops used to be withdrawn from the front and transferred to camps in southern France during the winter months, because French officials thought they could not bear cold weather. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of North and West Africans only came to Europe in the second half of the war. Thus, casualty rates should not be compared to overall figures of deployed soldiers, but to average figures.

Joe Harris Lunn, analysing annual casualty rates of West Africans, concludes that in the last two and-a-half years of the war, when their deployment in Europe reached its peak, the rate of killed and wounded West African soldiers was twice that of French infantrymen. Given the fact that West Africans used to be withdrawn from the front in the winter months, the probability of a West African soldier being killed during his time at the front was two and-a-half times as high as for a French infantryman. For the members of ethnic groups considered 'martial', such as the Wolof, Tukulor and Serer, it was even three times as high.⁵⁷

Another approach is to analyse casualty rates for individual battles. This can be done, thanks to figures provided by Marc Michel, for the battle of Reims (July 1917), the offensive at Villers-Cotterêt (July 1918) and the battle at Avre (July/August 1918). In all these battles, the rate of killed, wounded and missed was higher for West Africans than for French

infantrymen (Reims: 29.0% to 27.5%; Villers-Cotterêt: 33.6% to 23.6%; Avre: 19.8% to 17.5%).⁵⁸ There are also figures for several battles where Indian and British troops fought together. Here, there is hardly any difference between colonial and metropolitan soldiers. In the second battle of Ypres, the rate of killed, wounded and missing reached 30.4% for Indians and 29.8% for British soldiers.⁵⁹ In the battle of Neuve Chapelle, the casualty rate for British soldiers was even higher than for Indians (21% compared to 19%).⁶⁰

On balance, the canon fodder thesis can neither be entirely verified nor falsified by interpreting statistics. As far as West Africans are concerned, however, not only the doctrine of deployment, but also Lunn's analysis contradicts Marc Michel's statement that the cannon fodder thesis was just a legend.⁶¹

The second question linked to the deployment of colonial troops in Europe is whether they fought especially cruelly. The allegation that Africans and Indians engaged in brutal practices which were not in accordance with international law soon became a standard topic in German propaganda.⁶² Alleged atrocities committed by colonial soldiers included violations of international regulations on the treatment of wounded combatants and prisoners captured on the battlefield, the hunt for trophies such as fingers, ears and heads, and the use of allegedly unlawful weapons such as the *coupe-coupe* (long bush knives), in close combat.

Did these allegations have any substance? First, it is striking that German propaganda repeatedly told the same atrocity stories involving colonial soldiers. Thus, if these stories, which hardly number a dozen, were based on reality at all, they were obviously isolated events. On the other hand, in German propaganda publications dealing with alleged Entente violations of international law in general, cases involving colonial troops did not appear more frequently than average.⁶³ As far as close combat is concerned, the use of the *coupe-coupe* cannot be denied,⁶⁴ yet this was by no means unlawful and it is doubtful whether the use of these knives was more 'barbaric' than the use of bayonets and spades in close combat. The stories about the cutting off of ears and heads were probably the German response to Entente propaganda concerning German atrocities in Belgium, where the cutting off of Belgian children's hands was a standard topic.⁶⁵

Yet the notion that some of the atrocity stories were at least partly true cannot be dismissed out of hand. Some of the French colonial troops indeed originated from areas where the hunt for heads as trophies had been an important element of traditional warfare.⁶⁶ Furthermore, there are also French sources – albeit hostile to the deployment of colonial troops

in Europe – which talk about colonial soldiers proudly displaying heads and ears.⁶⁷ In general, however, colonial troops' methods of warfare did not differ significantly from those of European units.⁶⁸

Cultural impact

The deployment of more than half a million African and Asian soldiers in Europe had a strong cultural impact. Never before had so many Europeans been confronted with so many Africans and Asians – as comrades in arms, as enemies at the front, or as prisoners of war. This produced discourses about the colonial soldiers, which included exoticism, racism and paternalism.⁶⁹ On the other hand, never before had so many men from the colonies been directly exposed to the realities of European culture and society. The experience had an impact on their perceptions of their colonial masters and on the long-range, changed colonial relationships.

European images of African and Asian soldiers evolved in different ways on both sides of the western front. In Germany, representation further developed along the line of racist pre-war imagery, even reaching the extremes of representing colonial soldiers as beasts. In summer 1915, the German Foreign Office put into circulation a pamphlet with the title *Employment, Contrary to International Law, of Coloured Troops upon the European Theatre of War by England and France*, in which, as mentioned above, many atrocities were attributed to colonial soldiers, such as the poking out of eyes and the cutting off of the ears, noses and heads of wounded and captured German soldiers.⁷⁰ The colonial troops were labelled with expressions that negated their quality as regular military forces, for example 'a motley crew of colours and religions', 'devils', 'dehumanised wilderness', 'dead vermin of the wilderness', 'Africans jumping around in a devilish ecstasy', 'auxiliary rabble of all colours'. Other idioms used included 'an exhibition of Africans', or 'an anthropological show of uncivilised or half civilised bands and hordes', 'black flood' or 'dark mud', and finally the catchphrase 'the black shame' [*schwarze Schmach*] which quickly rose to common usage in the early 1920s.⁷¹

However, another image – diametrically opposed to the above – was to be found in publications trying to justify the German practice of recruiting Muslim prisoners of war (POWs) for the Ottoman army or in propaganda attempting to prove the cannon fodder thesis. Thus German propaganda sought to profit from the alliance with the Ottoman empire and to present the Central Powers as friends of Islam, for instance by arranging the publication of several texts by the Algerian officer Rabah Abdallah Boukabouya, who had deserted in 1915.⁷² Muslim deserters and prisoners

of war were interned in the so-called ‘crescent camp’ (*Halbmondlager*) at Wünsdorf near Zossen, which comprised a mosque erected at the Kaiser’s expense.⁷³ As for German civilians, some of them developed a more exotic view than official propaganda and met African and Asian POWs with curiosity and fascination, albeit often tinged with fear.

Another recurrent theme in German propaganda against the deployment of colonial troops on European battlefields was its alleged impact on the future of the colonial system and the supremacy of the ‘white race’. If African and Asian soldiers were trained in the handling of modern arms, if they were brought to Europe and saw the white nations fighting against each other, and if they were even allowed to participate in these battles and experience the vulnerability of the white man, then they would lose their respect once and for all. After the war, they would turn their weapons against their own masters and remove colonial rule. Thus German propaganda argued that the French and British policy of deploying colonial troops in Europe was a flagrant breach of white solidarity and should be condemned by every civilized nation.⁷⁴

Entente propaganda countered these allegations within the patterns of pre-World War argumentation, albeit with some modifications. In the first months of the war, representations of colonial troops in the French press did not differ much from German propaganda images. Two weeks after the outbreak of the war, the *Dépêche Coloniale* portrayed African soldiers as *démons noirs* who would carry over the Rhine, with their bayonets, the revenge of civilization against modern barbarism.⁷⁵ In February 1915, the Marseilles-based journal *Midi Colonial* published a cartoon showing a Muslim soldier wearing a necklace with German soldiers’ ears. The subtitle ran: ‘Be silent, be careful, enemy ears are listening!’⁷⁶

Beginning in 1915/16, officials propagated a modified image of infantile and devoted savages. The colonial soldiers were depicted as belonging to *races jeunes* and as absolutely obedient to the white masters because of the latter’s intellectual supremacy.⁷⁷ Alphonse Séché, for instance, stated in the weekly *L’Opinion*:

For the black man, the white man’s orders, the chief’s orders are summarised in one word that he repeats again and again ‘y a service’ . . . He won’t discuss; he does not try to understand. He would kill his father, mother, wife, child, in order to obey to the order he received. He is not responsible; a superior’s will is more important than his own one. . . . In all the blacks’ acts, we find this mixture of childlike innocence and heroism. . . . The Senegalese is brave by nature; as a primitive being, he does not analyse. . . . For the Senegalese, his officer

is everything; he replaces the absent chief of his village, his father. If the Senegalese has confidence in his chief, he does not do anything without consulting him . . .⁷⁸

This image also appeared in two special issues of the *Depêche Coloniale Illustrée* in January 1916 and in February 1917 as well as in Lieutenant Gaillet's book *Coulibaly: Les Sénégalais sur la terre de France* (published in 1917).⁷⁹ In pictorial representations, the images of the bloodthirsty *brute* and of the infantile savage were alternating.⁸⁰ The infantile savages in French wartime propaganda – often described as *grands enfants* – appeared as naive and almost sexless. Therefore, they were a danger neither to white supremacy in the colonial world, nor to the French metropolitan population.

This propaganda was produced to counter German propaganda as well as to calm the French population's reservation about the African troops' presence in France. Large parts of the French population seem to have shared the image of colonial troops as bloodthirsty savages that was omnipresent in the German propaganda. When the first units from West Africa arrived in France, large crowds welcomed them shouting: 'Bravo les tirailleurs sénégalais! Couper têtes aux allemands!'⁸¹

This image also seems to have caused a latent popular opposition against stationing African soldiers at the Côte d'Azur. Lucie Cousturier, who had been acquainted with several wounded Senegalese soldiers in the military hospital at Fréjus during and after the war, wrote about the French population's feelings towards the Africans in her book *Des Inconnus chez moi* (1920):

In April and May of 1916 we were very anxious about our future friends. . . . There was simply no crime that one could put beyond them: . . . drunkenness, theft, rape, epidemics . . . 'What will become of us?' the farmers' wives moaned. . . ' We cannot let our little daughters go out alone any more because of those savages. We do not even risk going out alone ourselves any more . . . Imagine! If you were in the hands of those gorillas!'⁸²

Below the level of official French propaganda, for instance in trench journals, images very similar to those of German propaganda were also to be found as far as sexuality was concerned. A postcard depicting an African grasping a white French woman's breast with the cry 'Vive les Teutons' has to be seen in this context.⁸³ Thus to some extent German propaganda on this topic seems to have reflected the French *poilu's* fears.

The French military administration promoted the image of primitive savages, too. For instance, African soldiers were given boots from the French arsenals that were far too big for them, as their feet were supposed

to have enormous dimensions because of permanent barefooted walking.⁸⁴ As late as in 1917, there was a proposal that West African soldiers should fight barefoot, because with French boots, ‘those agile apes are loosing one of their best infantry qualities, namely their elasticity at marching.’⁸⁵

French propaganda also again and again stressed the alleged identity of interests between France and its colonised peoples. The *Revue de Paris*, for instance, stated in 1915:

Their existence, their destiny is connected to ours. It is our task to elevate them to a superior life and to protect them from German rule that everywhere has been very hard for indigenous peoples and that considers its colonies only as a field of exploitation. So, we have got the right – and not only the master’s right – to request our subjects’ help, for their interests are mingled with ours.⁸⁶

According to the journal *Afrique Française*, the *grands enfants joyeux* wanted to prove by their disciplined heroism their gratitude towards the ‘glorious country that civilised them.’⁸⁷ In June 1917, a *Journée de l’Armée d’Afrique et des troupes coloniales* was celebrated in order to demonstrate the ties between motherland and colonies.⁸⁸

On balance, this stress on the colonial soldiers’ bravery and loyalty was intended not only to counter German propaganda concerning France’s supposed ‘betrayal’ of white solidarity, but also to offset objections from French military circles and especially colonial administrations. Yet, despite the utter contrary lines of argument in German and Entente propaganda, basic common structures can be delineated. Both sides held a similar view of colonial soldiers as fundamentally different and inferior, which implies a common European racism.

But how did colonial soldiers perceive Europe and the Europeans? Several scholars have examined this question by analysing letters and memoirs as well as by conducting studies based on oral history. As for Indian soldiers, there exist several articles on war letters.⁸⁹ These show a far from uniform strategy on the part of Indian soldiers coping with the experience of a completely foreign world.

Some of the Indian soldiers obviously were able to integrate what they experienced in Europe into their cognitive background. They enjoyed honour gained on the battlefields and were proud of the English king’s power. Thus, a wounded Garhwali wrote to a friend in India in February 1915:

England is a superb country with an excellent climate. Think it a great honour that we have an opportunity of showing our loyalty to our great Emperor by the sacrifice of our bodies and by the favour that is accorded to us of being present on the field of battle. . . . If our ancestors

help us and God shows us favour, if we die on the battlefield in the service of our King, this is equal to entering heaven. . . . My prayer is that the great God will quickly make me well and give me an opportunity of showing my loyalty.⁹⁰

Soldiers from this group even thought it possible to marry a European woman, albeit following Indian customs.

For a second group, there was a large gap between what they were used to in India and what they experienced in Europe. Comparing these two worlds, they arrived at a rejection of their own customs and habits and an unconditional admiration for the European social, economic and gender order. A Hindu military surgeon stationed in England, for instance, stated in a letter to a friend in Peshawar at the beginning of the year 1915:

When one considers this country and these people in comparison with our own country and our own people one cannot be but distressed. Our country is very poor and feeble and its lot is very depressed. Our people copy the faults of the British nation and leave its good qualities alone. We shall never advance ourselves merely by wearing trousers and hats and smoking cigarettes and drinking wine. In fact they have a real moral superiority. They are energetic. We are poor and hunger for ease. They limit their leisure, do their work justly and do it well. They do not follow their own inclinations, but obey their superior officers and masters. They avoid idle chatter. Their delight is cleanliness. Even a sweeper will not remain in a bare house. He will adorn it with some green plants and flowers and will take pains to improve his condition. Never under any circumstances do they tell lies. As for shopkeepers, everything has a fixed price. You may take it or leave it as you please.⁹¹

Muslim soldier Shah Nawaz even wrote in a letter from Marseilles in September 1915:

The Creator has shown the perfection of his benefice in Europe, and we people have been created only for the purpose of completing the totality of the world. In truth, it has now become evident that the Indian is not fit to stand in any rank of the world. You may be sure that India will not rise to the pitch of perfection of Europe for another two thousand years. The French nation is highly civilised, and they have great soldiers to an extent of which we are not – and never could be – worthy.⁹²

A third group of Indian soldiers tried to defend their cultural identity, to meet their religious duties and traditional expectations as men and warriors. However, it was particularly soldiers from this third group who went on to suffer despair and resignation.

As for West African soldiers, the two key sources available are Bakary Diallo's memoirs⁹³ and an extensive oral history study conducted by Joe Harris Lunn in the 1980s.⁹⁴ Bakary Diallo's memoirs entitled *Force-bonté*

were published in 1926 as the first book in French authored by a Black African. Diallo had obviously strongly adhered to French colonial ideologies. He first describes himself and his comrades as being on the same level as French children, who then gradually reached the higher stages of French civilisation thanks to military service, until they were completely assimilated and started even to dream in French.

Diallo's war experience, however, differed from that of most of his comrades in several respects. He had volunteered for the French army as early as 1911, so he did not experience the forced conscription between 1914 and 1917 that traumatised West African populations. Diallo's experience at the front was not representative either. He had only been at the front for a relatively short time. Already on 3 November 1914, he was wounded and afterwards promoted. He gained a distinction for bravery and was even granted French citizenship in 1920. After the war, he would remain in France until 1928.

Thanks to Lunn's oral history study, we are also informed about the war experience of a larger group of West Africans. Lunn interviewed 85 Senegalese veterans in 1982/83, about half of the veterans still living at that time. His book shows, that important cultural changes in Franco-Senegalese relations took place in the years from 1914 to 1918. West Africans would no longer think of the French as almighty 'devils', as they had done before. This would promote their self-consciousness in the post-war period.

Conclusion

On balance, the deployment of colonial troops in Europe proved to be a dramatic experience for all contemporaries. Forced recruitment in the colonies met several forms of resistance, including even armed rebellions. Deployment in Europe would then change many Africans' and Asians' perceptions of their colonial masters and of Europeans in general. Europeans, on the other hand, whilst preserving racist stereotypes, became aware of the precariousness of their global dominance. However, the impact of colonial troops' deployment in Europe in the First World War on the colonial system is still debated. In particular, the colonial veterans' digestion of their European experience was far from uniform.

The use of colonial troops would remain an issue in the early 1920s, when France (unlike Britain) deployed many African and Asian soldiers as occupation troops in the German Rhineland. German propaganda now altered the bloodthirsty beast into 'lusty coloured murderers' who raped; the poster *Jumbo* became famous showing an enormous black soldier wearing

nothing but a helmet and pressing white women to his belly. Although the vast majority of African occupation troops on the Rhine came from Morocco and Algeria, people generally spoke of the 'black shame' and the 'black horror' in a propaganda campaign lasting more than two years and backed by all political parties with the exception of the extreme left.⁹⁵ In the aftermath of the Franco-Belgian invasion of the Ruhr in January 1923, the German propaganda campaign against the 'black shame' evidently decreased. Apparently, in the eyes of the Germans the French had discredited themselves so deeply before the international community that further topical reference to 'colonial troops' was no longer needed.

In the Second World War, colonial troops were deployed on European battlefields once again.

During the western campaign, the German leadership planned a similar propaganda initiative as in the previous war. On 23 May 1940, the section *Wehrmachtpropaganda* of the *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht* (OKW) passed an urgent directive that all propaganda channels should 'quickly take photographs showing particularly good-looking German soldiers with particularly bestial-looking Senegalese Negroes and other coloured prisoners of war ... Sharp racial contrasts are of special importance'.⁹⁶ Because of the western campaign's brevity, the propaganda in the spring of 1940 was not as intense as in the years 1914–23. This time, however, the perception of colonial soldiers as inferior beings was not restricted to pamphlets and posters. German troops, when they captured French units, sometimes systematically sought out African soldiers and shot them immediately. At least 3000 soldiers are estimated to have died in this way.⁹⁷ In the last months of the war German propaganda again represented black French soldiers as murderers and rapists.⁹⁸ The colonial troops' last battles did not take place in Europe, however, but in the decolonisation wars of the 1950s and 60s, where troops from one colony would often be deployed to fight against anti-colonial uprisings in another.⁹⁹

Notes

- [1] For an overview see Waites, 'Peoples of the Underdeveloped World', 596–614.
- [2] See Burdick and Moessner, *The German Prisoners-of-War in Japan*; Krebs, 'Die etwas andere Kriegsgefangenschaft', 323–37, and Hermann Joseph Hiery, *The Neglected war*.
- [3] See Grove, 'The First Shots of the Great War'; and Krech, *Die Kampfhandlungen in den ehemaligen deutschen Kolonien*.
- [4] See Davenport, 'The South African Rebellion, 1914'; Garson, 'South Africa and World War I'; Katzenellenbogen, 'Southern Africa and the War of 1914–1918',

107–121; and Krech, *Die Kampfhandlungen in den ehemaligen deutschen Kolonien*.

- [5] See von Lettow-Vorbeck, *Meine Erinnerungen*; Deppe, *Mit Lettow-Vorbeck*; Buhner, *L'Afrique orientale allemande*; Paice, *Tip and Run*; Samson, *Britain, South Africa and the East Africa Campaign*; Anderson, *The Forgotten Front*; Strachan, *The First World War in Africa*; Gardner, *German East*; Bradley, 'The 1914–18 Campaign', 27–36; Greenstein, 'The Impact of Military Service'; Hodges, *The Carrier Corps*; Krech, *Die Kampfhandlungen in den ehemaligen deutschen Kolonien*; Miller, *Battle for the Bundu*; Mundry and Savage, 'Carrier Corps Recruitment'; Hodges, 'African Manpower Statistics'; Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 240–72; and Michels, 'Askari – treu bis in den Tod?', 171–86.
- [6] See Bernard, *L'Afrique du Nord*; Meynier, *L'Algérie révélée*; and Goldstein, *Libération ou annexion*.
- [7] See Michel, *L'appel à l'Afrique*.
- [8] See War Office, *Statistics of the Military Effort*, 772; Carrington, 'The Empire at War', 642; Beckett, 'The Nation in Arms', 13–14; Grundy, *Soldiers without Politics*, 54; Besson and Perreau-Pradier, *L'Effort Colonial des Alliés*, 121–2; Willan, 'The South African Native Labour Contingent'; Smith, *Jamaican Volunteers in the First World War*; Schulze, *Die Rebellion der ägyptischen Fallahin*, 120–1; and Summershill, *China on the Western Front*; Wou, *Les travailleurs chinois*.
- [9] See Nogaro and Weil, *La main-d'œuvre étrangère et coloniale*; Varet, *Du concours apporté à la France*, 41–5; Bousset, *La France d'outre-mer*, 67–73; Schor, *Histoire de l'immigration en France*, 40–4; Sarraut, *La mise en valeur*, 43; Duong, *L'Indochine pendant la Guerre de 1914–1918*, 107–132; Ray, *Les Marocains en France*, 48–59; Meynier, *L'Algérie révélée*, 405–13 and 459–84; Talha, *Le salariat immigré*, 63–78; Ageron and Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, 1157–60; Stora, *Ils venaient d'Algérie*, 14–15; Chen, *Chinese Migrations*; and Wang, 'Chinesische Kontraktarbeiter', 440–3.
- [10] See Stovall, 'The Color Line behind the Lines'.
- [11] See Greenhut, 'The Imperial Reserve'; Ellinwood and Pradham, *India and World War I*; Merewether and Smith, *The Indian Corps in France*; Willcocks, *With the Indians in France*.
- [12] See Killingray, 'The Idea of a British Imperial African Army'.
- [13] *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th series, vol. 82, 2023–5.
- [14] See Smith, *Jamaican Volunteers in the First World War*.
- [15] See Pershing, *My Experiences in the World War*, vol. 2, 64.
- [16] Sarraut, *La mise en valeur*, 44; see also Fogarty, *Race and War in France*.
- [17] Hill, *The Marcus Garvey and Universal Negro Improvement Association Papers*, vol. 9, 588.
- [18] See Greenhut, 'The Imperial Reserve'.
- [19] See Echenberg, 'Paying the Blood Tax'; Michel, 'Le recrutement des tirailleurs'; Clarke, *West Africans at War*.
- [20] Meynier, *L'Algérie révélée*, 405.
- [21] Michel, *L'appel à l'Afrique*, 84.
- [22] See Cornevin, *La République populaire*, 418–23; de Rivières, *Histoire du Niger*, 224–30; Michel, *L'appel à l'Afrique*, 50–7, 100–16, 118–20 and 127–30; Lunn, *Memoirs of the Maelstrom*, 33–58; Fournier, *Historique du 2^e Régiment de Tirailleurs Sénégalais*, 169–89; Echenberg, 'Les Migrations militaires'; Asiwaju,

- 'Migration as revolt', 577–94; Hebert, 'Révoltes en Haute Volta'; Garcia, 'Les mouvements de résistance'; Johnson and Summers, 'World War I: Conscription and Social Change in Guinea'; D'Almeida-Topor, 'Les populations dahoméens'; Lombard, *Structures de type féodal*, 412–28; Suret-Canale, *Schwarzafrika*, vol. II, 183–91; Loth, *Geschichte Afrikas*, vol. II, 119–22; Kouandété, *Un aspect de l'insurrection nationaliste*; Mercier, *Tradition, changement, histoire*, 435–48; and Gnankambary, 'La révolte bobo de 1916'.
- [23] See Ageron and Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, 1142–3 and 1150–7; Meynier, *L'Algérie révélée*, 569–98.
- [24] See Lejri, *L'histoire du mouvement national*, 157–63.
- [25] See Michel, *L'appel à l'Afrique*, 73–81; Margueritte, *L'immense effort*, 127–33.
- [26] Cited in Delafosse, *Maurice Delafosse*, 310.
- [27] Cited in Michel, *L'appel à l'Afrique*, 43.
- [28] Cited in Delafosse, *Maurice Delafosse*, 310.
- [29] Cited in Michel, *L'appel à l'Afrique*, 132.
- [30] Cited in *Ibid.*, 133.
- [31] Cited in Delafosse, *Maurice Delafosse*, 338.
- [32] See Echenberg, *Colonial Conscripts*, 44; *Une ame de Chef*, 27–8 and 264–6.
- [33] See Glinga, 'Ein koloniales Paradoxon', 21–37; Crowder, 'Blaise Diagne and the Recruitment of African Troops', 104–21; Lunn, *Memoirs of the Maelstrom*, 73–81; Michel, *L'appel à l'Afrique*, 223–38; *idem*, 'La genèse du recrutement'.
- [34] See Ageron, *Les Algériens musulmans*, vol. 2, 1146–7.
- [35] Cited in *Ibid.*, 1162.
- [36] *Ibid.*, 1064–5.
- [37] See Fernand Farjanel, 'Une armée jaune', *Revue de Paris* 23 (1916): 112–37.
- [38] See Mangin, *Lettres de Guerre*, 125–6; Ageron, *Les Algériens musulmans*, 1164; *idem*, 'Clemenceau et la question coloniale', 80.
- [39] See Merewether and Smith, *The Indian Corps in France*; Willcocks, *With the Indians in France*; Greenhut, 'The Imperial Reserve'; Omissi, *The Sepoy and the Raj*, 38–40, 65–6, 78–82, 114–23 and 160–2; Mason, *A Matter of Honour*, 412–21; Smith, *Britain's Brigade of Gurkhas*, 42–51 and 72–84; Toker, *Gorkha*, 192–200; MacMunn, *The Martial Races of India*, 318–40; Farwell, *The Gurkhas*, 86–104; *idem*, *Armies of the Raj*, 248–66; Bolt, *Gurkhas*, 90–6; Trench, *The Indian Army*, 31–66; Mollo, *The Indian Army*, 139–44; Banskota, *The Gurkha Connection*, 122–30; *History of the 5th Royal Gurkha Rifles*, 217–71 and 310–17; Besson and Perreau-Pradier, *L'Effort Colonial des Alliés*, 123–4; Pradhan, 'The Indian Army and the First World War', 49–67; *idem*, 'The Sikh Soldier in the First World War', 177–211; Ellinwood, 'Ethnicity in a Colonial Asian Army', 89–144; and Latter, 'The Indian Army in Mesopotamia', 92–102, 160–79 and 232–46.
- [40] See Balesi, *From Adversaries to Comrades-in-Arms*, 99.
- [41] See Bernard, *L'Afrique du Nord*; Horne, *The Price of Glory*, 111–12. Also Heather Jones's contribution to this special issue.
- [42] See, for example, Michel, *L'appel à l'Afrique*; Bekraoui, 'Les soldats marocains'; and Kamian, *Des tranchées de Verdun*.
- [43] See, for example, Horne, *The Price of Glory*, 100–101; Goldstein, *Libération ou annexion*, 176–7; Crowder, 'The 1914–1918 European War and West Africa', 494.
- [44] See Paul Mangin, 'Troupes noires', *Revue de France* 16 (1909): 61–80 and 383–98; *idem*, 'Soldats Noirs en Europe', *Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales* 13 (1909):

449–60.; idem, *La Force Noire*; idem, ‘Troupes noires’, *Revue de Paris* 18 (1911): 484–94; idem, ‘De l’emploi des troupes noires’, *Revue anthropologique* 21 (1911): 113–28.

- [45] Barbusse, *Le Feu*, 48–9.
- [46] Boussenot, *France d’outre-mer*, 43.
- [47] Cited in Michel, *L’appel à l’Afrique*, 323.
- [48] Cited in Ageron, *Clemenceau et la question coloniale*, 80.
- [49] Paul Mangin, ‘Comment finit la guerre’, *Revue des Deux Mondes* 57 (1920): 794.
- [50] See Barrows, ‘L’influence des conquêtes algériennes et coloniales’, 111; and Lunn, ‘Kande Kamara Speaks’, 39.
- [51] Cited in Becker, *Les Français dans la Grande Guerre*, 316 as well as in Michel, *L’appel à l’Afrique*, 408.
- [52] Michel, *L’appel à l’Afrique*, 407–8.
- [53] Edouard de Martonne, ‘La Vérité sur les Tirailleurs Sénégalais’, *Outre-Mer: Revue Générale de Colonisation* 7 (1935): 41.
- [54] See Bidwell, *Morocco under Colonial Rule*, 297.
- [55] See Recham, *Les musulmans algériens*, 23–4.
- [56] Benamrane, *L’émigration algérienne*, 28; and Ruf, ‘Politische und ökonomische Ursachen’, 68.
- [57] Lunn, *Memoirs of the Maelstrom*, 140–7.
- [58] Michel, *L’appel à l’Afrique*, 329–30.
- [59] See Merewether and Smith, *The Indian Corps in France*, 332.
- [60] See Greenhut, ‘The Imperial Reserve’, 65.
- [61] Michel, *L’appel à l’Afrique*, 337.
- [62] See, for example, Auswärtiges Amt, *Employment, Contrary to International Law, of Coloured Troops*; Belius, *Die farbigen Hilfsvölker*.
- [63] See, for example, *Frankreich und die Genfer Konvention*, 2 vols. (1917); German Reichstag, *Völkerrecht im Weltkrieg*.
- [64] See Deroo and Champeaux, *La Force Noire*, 62–5.
- [65] Horne and Kramer, ‘German “Atrocities”’; idem, ‘War between Soldiers and Enemy Civilians’; idem, *German Atrocities, 1914*.
- [66] See Sterckx, *La tête et les seins*, 79–81.
- [67] See, for example, Marthe Bigot, ‘Armée Noire’, *Humanité*, 31 October 1920: 1.
- [68] See also Read, *Atrocity Propaganda*, 4.
- [69] See Koller, ‘Von Wilden aller Rassen niedergemetzelt’; idem, ‘Enemy Images’, 139–57; Kettlitz, *Afrikanische Soldaten*; Lunn, ‘“Les Races Guerrières”’; Lüsebrink, ‘“Tirailleurs Sénégalais”’, 57–71; Martin, ‘German and French Perceptions’; and Melzer, ‘The “Mise-en-scène” of the “Tirailleurs Sénégalais”’, 213–44.
- [70] Auswärtiges Amt, *Employment, Contrary to International Law, of Coloured Troops*.
- [71] Rosen, *England*, 96 and 98; Valois, *Nieder mit England!*, 7; Borchardt, ‘Der Krieg und die deutsche Selbsteinkehr’, 243; Lisbeth Dill, ‘Die Gefangenenlager bei Merseburg’, *Gartenlaube* 63 (1915): 7–9; *Ein Dutzend englischer Sünden wider das Völkerrecht: Tatsachen und Feststellungen* (1916): 5; *Kriegschronik. Kriegstagebuch, Soldatenbriefe, Kriegsbilder*, June 1915: 48; *Illustrierte Geschichte des Weltkrieges*, vol. 5 (Stuttgart, 1916) 307; and Baer, *Der Völkrieg*, vol. 3, 217 and vol. 10, 107.
- [72] Rabah Abdallah Boukabouya, *L’Islam dans l’armée française* (Constantinople, 1915); idem, ‘Die marokkanischen Kaida unter der französischen Herrschaft’, *Korrespondenzblatt der Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient*, 3 (1916): 220–2, 271–3

- and 328–30; idem, ‘Der General Gourand als Generalresident von Marokko’, *Korrespondenzblatt der Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient*, 3 (1916): 419–20; idem, ‘Das Protektorat über Marokko. General Lyautey und seine Islampolitik’, *Islamische Welt*, 1, no. 3 (1917): 57–8 and 1, no. 4 (1917): 253–4; idem, ‘Die “Weissen Väter”’, *Islamische Welt*, 1, no. 6 (1917): 352–3; idem, ‘Der zukünftige Friede und die algerischen Muslims’, *Islamische Welt*, 1, no. 9 (1917): 557–9. On Boukabouya see also Müller, *Islam, gihad* (‘Heiliger Krieg’) und *Deutsches Reich*, 270, 292–6, 341–47.
- [73] See Höpp, *Muslimen in der Mark*; Kahleyss, *Muslimen in Brandenburg*; and Hinz, ‘Die deutschen “Barbaren” sind doch die besseren Menschen’, 339–61.
- [74] See, for example, Müller–Meiningen, *Der Weltkrieg und das Völkerrecht*, 68–9. Also Schütze, *Englands Blutschuld gegen die weiße Rasse*; and Stibbe, *German Anglophobia*, 38–43.
- [75] *La Dépêche Coloniale*, 18 August 1914.
- [76] Cited in Michel, *L’appel à l’Afrique*, 345.
- [77] See, for example, Bousset, *La France d’outre–mer*, 23.
- [78] Alphonse Séché, ‘Les Noirs: L’âme du Sénégalais’, *L’Opinion* 8/41 (1915): 286–8.
- [79] Gaillet, *Coulibaly*.
- [80] See Gervereau, ‘De bien trop noirs desseins’.
- [81] Cited in Diallo, *Force–Bonté*, 113.
- [82] Cousturier, *Des Inconnus chez moi*, 12–13.
- [83] Melzer, ‘The “Mise-en-Scène” of the “Tirailleurs Sénégalais”’, 222–8. This is a play on words with the expressions *teutons* (Teutons, Germans) and *tétons* (tits).
- [84] Tharaud and Tharaud, *La randonnée de Samba Diouf*, 100.
- [85] ‘L’utilisation des Troupes Noires’, *Revue de Paris* 24 (1917): 872–94 (here 882).
- [86] ‘Troupes coloniales: Nos forces ignorés’, *Revue de Paris* 17 (1915): 265–80 (here 266).
- [87] ‘Les Noirs: Soldats de la civilisation’, *Afrique Française* 27 (1917): 317–318 (here 317).
- [88] Meynier and Thobie, *Histoire de la France Coloniale*, vol. 2, 424.
- [89] See Vankoski, ‘Letters Home’; Koller, ‘Überkreuzende Frontlinien?’; idem, ‘Krieg, Fremdheitserfahrung und Männlichkeit’, 117–28; idem, ‘Representing Otherness’; Omissi, ‘Europe through Indian Eyes’, 371–96.
- [90] Omissi, *Indian Voices of the Great War*, 39.
- [91] *Ibid.*, 33–4.
- [92] *Ibid.*, 96–7.
- [93] Diallo, *Force–Bonté*. On Diallo see also Midiohouan, ‘Le tirailleur sénégalais’, 133–51; Riesz, ‘The *Tirailleur Sénégalais*’; idem, ‘Die Probe aufs Exempel’, 433–54.
- [94] Lunn, *Memoirs of the Maelstrom*. See also idem, ‘Kande Kamara Speaks’; Koller, ‘“Pourquoi pleurer pour des fils ingrats?”’.
- [95] See Nelson, ‘Black Horror on the Rhine’; Marks, ‘Black Watch on the Rhine’; Lebzelter, ‘Die “Schwarze Schmach”’; Koller, ‘*Von Wilden aller Rassen niedergemetzelt*’; idem, ‘Die “Schwarze Schmach”’, 155–69.
- [96] Boelcke, *Kriegspropaganda*, 130.
- [97] See Scheck, *Hitler’s African Victims*.
- [98] de Coquet, *Nous sommes les occupants*, 107.
- [99] See, for example, Deroo, *La Force Noire*, 203–11.

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