The July Crisis: The Russian Viewpoint

Statement by M. Sazonov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, August 2, 1914

. . . The Russian Government, to whom the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg had communicated the text of the note [i.e., the ultimatum to Serbia] seventeen hours after its presentation at Belgrade, having taken note of the demands contained therein, could not but perceive that some of these demands were im­possible of execution as regards their substance, whilst others were presented in a form which was incompatible with the dignity of an independent State. Russia considered that the humi­liation of Serbia, involved in these demands, and equally the evident intention of Austria-Hungary to secure her own hegemony in the Balkans, which underlay her conditions, were inadmissible. The Russian Government, therefore, pointed out to Austria-Hungary in the most friendly manner that it would be desirable to re-examine the points contained in the Austro-Hungarian note. The Austro-Hungarian Government did not see their way to agree to a discussion of the note. . . .

Despite the fact that Serbia had reprobated the crime, and had shown herself ready to give Austria satisfaction to an extent beyond the expectations, not only of Russia, but also of the other Powers—despite these facts, the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade considered the Serbian reply insufficient . . . .

Russia let it be clearly understood that she could accept a peaceful settlement of the question only so far as it involved no humiliation of Serbia as an independent State. Unhappily all the efforts of the Russian Government to this end were fruitless. The Austro-Hungarian Government, which had shunned any attempt at conciliatory intervention by the Powers in the Austrian dispute with Serbia, proceeded to mobilize and declared war officially against Serbia, and the following day Belgrade [the Serb capital] was bombarded. The manifesto which accompanied the declaration of war openly accuses Serbia of having prepared and carried out the crime of Sarajevo. Such an accusation of a crime at common law, launched against a whole people and a whole State, aroused, by its evident inanity, widespread sympathy for Serbia throughout all classes of European society.

In consequence of this behavior of the Austro-Hungarian Government, in spite of Russia's declaration that she could not remain indifferent to the fate of Serbia, the Russian Government considered it necessary to order mobilization [against Austria] in the military dis­tricts of Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan. This decision was rendered necessary by the fact that since the date when the Austro-Hungarian note was communicated to the Serbian Government, and since the first steps taken by Russia, five days had elapsed, and yet the Vienna Cabinet had not taken one step to meet Russia halfway in her efforts towards peace. Indeed, quite the contrary; for the mobilization of half of the Austro-Hungarian army had been ordered. . . . .

When questioned by the German Ambassador as to the con­ditions on which we would still agree to suspend our prepara­tions, the [Russian] Minister for Foreign Affairs declared that these con­ditions were Austria's recognition that the Austro-Serbian question had assumed a European character, and a declaration by her that she agreed not to insist upon such of her demands as were incompatible with the sovereign rights of Serbia. Germany considered this Russian proposal unacceptable to Austria-Hungary.

The failure of our proposals for peace compelled us to extend the scope of our precautionary military measures. The Berlin Cabinet questioned us on this, and we replied that Russia was compelled to begin preparations so as to be ready for every emergency.

But while taking this precautionary step, Russia did not on that account abandon her strenuous efforts to find some solution of the situation, and she announced that she was ready to accent any proposed settlement of the problem that might be put forward, provided it complied with the conditions laid down by her.

In spite of this conciliatory communication, the German Government on the 31st July demanded of the Russian Government that they should suspend their military measures by midday on the 1st August and threatened, should they fail to comply, to proceed to general mobilization.

On the following day, the 1st August, the German Ambassador, on behalf of his Government, forwarded a decla­ration of war to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.