The July Crisis: The German Viewpoint

On June 28th the Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, were assassinated by a member of a band of Serbian conspirators. The investigation of the crime through the Austro-Hungarian authorities has yielded the fact that the conspiracy . . was prepared and abetted in Belgrade [the Serb capital] with the cooperation of Serbian officials, and executed with arms from the Serbian State arsenal. This crime must have opened the eyes of the entire civilized world not only in regard to the aims of the Serbian policies directed against the conservation and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but also concerning the criminal means which the pan-Serb propaganda in Serbia had no hesitation in employing for the achievement of these aims.

The goal of these policies was the gradual revolutionizing and final separation of the south-easterly districts [viz., Bosnia-Herzegovina] from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and their union with Serbia. This direction of Serbia's policy has not been altered in the least in spite of the repeated and solemn declarations of Serbia in which it vouchsafed a change in these policies towards Austria-Hungary a well as the cultivation of good and neighborly relations. . . .

Under these circumstances it was clear to Austria that it was not compatible with the dignity and the spirit of self-preservation of the monarchy to view idly any longer this agitation across the border. The [Austro-Hungarian] Government appraised Germany of this conception and asked for our opinion. With all our heart we were able to agree with our ally's estimate of the situation, and assured him that any action considered necessary to end the movement in Serbia directed against the conservation of the monarchy would meet with our approval.

We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Serbia might bring Russia upon the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with our duty as allies. We could not, however, in these vital interests of Austria-Hungary, which were at stake, advise our ally to take a yielding attitude not compatible with his dignity, nor deny him our assistance in these trying days. We could do this all the less as our own interests were menaced through the continued Serb agitation. If the Serbs continued with the aid of Russia and France to menace the existence of Austria-Hungary, the gradual collapse of Austria and the subjection of all the Slavs under one Russian scepter would be the consequence, thus making untenable the position of the Teutonic race in Central Europe. A morally weakened Austria under the pressure of Russian pan-Slavism would be no longer an ally on whom we could count and in whom we could have confidence, as we must be able to have, in view of the ever more menacing attitude of our easterly and westerly neighbors. We, therefore, permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Serbia, but have not participated in her [military] preparations.. . . .

From this moment[i.e., with rejection of the Austrian ultimatum by Serbia on July 25], Austria was in fact in a state of war with Serbia, which it proclaimed officially on the 28th of July by declaring war.

From the beginning of the conflict we assumed the position that there were here concerned the affairs of Austria alone, which it would have to settle with Serbia. We therefore directed our efforts toward the localizing of the war, and toward convincing the other powers that Austria-Hungary had to appeal to arms in justifiable self-defense, forced upon her by the conditions. We emphatically took the position that no civilized country possessed the right to stay the arm of Austria in this struggle with barbarism and political crime, and to shield the Serbians against their just punishment. . . .

The Russian Government submitted an official communiqué on July 24th, according to which Russia could not possibly remain indifferent in the Serbo-Austrian conflict. . . . The German Government declared . . that Austria-Hungary had no desire for conquest and only wished peace at her frontiers. After the official explanation by Austria-Hungary to Russia that it did not claim territorial gain in Serbia, the decision concerning the peace of the world rested exclusively with [Russia]. [On July 26th] the first news of Russian mobilization reached Berlin [the German capital]. . .

After the Russian general mobilization [i.e., full mobilization against Germany and Austria] became known [on July 31st] . . the German ambassador at St. Petersburg [the Russian capital] was instructed to explain to the Russian Government that Germany declared the state of war as counter-measure against the general mobilization of the Russian army and navy which must be followed by [German] mobilization if Russia did not cease its military measures against Germany and Austria-Hungary within 12 hours, and notified Germany thereof.

The reply of the Russian Government has never reached us. . . . As the time limit given to Russia had expired . . . H.M. the Kaiser ordered the mobilization of the entire German Army and Navy on August 1st . . .

Source:   The German White Book (From Collected Documents relating to the outbreak of the European War, British Parliamentary Papers, Cd. 7860, 1915