The July Crisis: A French Viewpoint

Communication of the French ambassador at Berlin, Jules Cambon, to the Acting (French) Minister for Foreign Affairs.

July 24, 1914.

I asked the Secretary of State [i.e., Herr von Jagow] to-day . . . if it was correct, as announced in the newspapers, that Austria had presented a note to the Powers on her dispute with Serbia; if he had received it; and what view he took of it.

Herr von Jagow answered me in the affirmative, adding that the note was forcible, and that he approved it, the Serbian Government having for a long time past wearied the patience of Austria.

. . . . I then said to him that not having as yet received any instructions, the views which I wished to exchange with him were strictly personal. Thereupon I asked him if the Berlin Cabinet had really been entirely ignorant of Austria's requirements before they were communicated to Belgrade, and as he told me that that was so, I showed him my surprise at seeing him thus undertake to support claims, of whose limit and scope he was ignorant.

Herr von Jagow interrupted me, and said, " It is only because we are having a personal conversation that I allow you to say that to me."

"Certainly," I replied, " but if Peter I [King of Serbia] humiliates himself [i.e., by accepting the Austrian ultimatum in its entirety], domestic trouble will probably break out in Serbia; that will open the door to fresh possibilities, and do you know where you will be led by Vienna [i.e., the Austrian government]? I added that the language of the German newspapers was not the language of persons who were indifferent to, and unacquainted with, the question, but betoken an active support. Finally, 1 remarked that the shortness of the time limit given to Serbia [i.e., 48 hours]for submission would make an unpleasant impression in Europe.

. . . . "I have no doubt," I then said to him, "that Russia would endeavor to persuade the (Serbian government) to make acceptable concessions; but why not ask from one what is being asked from the other, and if reliance is being placed on advice being given (to Serbia), is it not also legitimate to rely on advice being given (to Austria) from another quarter [i.e., Germany]

The Secretary of State . . . asked me if I really thought the situation serious. "Certainly," I answered, "because if what is happening is the result of due reflection, I do not understand why all means of retreat have been cut off."

All the evidence shows that Germany is ready to support Austria's attitude with unusual energy. . . . . An article which appeared in [a Berlin newspaper] this evening shows also that at the German Chancery [i.e., Office of the Prime Minister] there exists a state of mind to which we in Paris are naturally not inclined to pay sufficient attention, I mean the feeling that the monarchies [i.e., Germany and Austria] must stand together. I am convinced that great weight must be attached to this point of view in order to appreciate the attitude of the (German) Emperor William, whose impressionable nature must have been affected by the assassination of a prince whose guest he had been a few days previously.

It is not less striking to notice the pains with which Herr von Jagow and all the officials placed under his orders, pretend to every one that they were ignorant of the scope of the note [i.e., the ultimatum of July 23] sent by Austria to Serbia.

Source:  Edmund von Mach, Official Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War (Macmillan, 1916), pp. 81-2